EXCLUSIVE: Will the Iran War Affect the Midterms?

The Iran War began on February 28, with the United States and Israel launching major strikes on Iran in the middle of ongoing nuclear negotiations. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other senior officials were reported killed in the opening strikes, and Iran responded with missile and drone attacks against Israel and US-linked targets across the region.

The early March showed just how fast a regional conflict can go global. Iranian attacks threatened Gulf states and American military installations, while shipping through the Strait of Hormuz – one of the world’s most important chokepoints for oil transit – immediately took a severe hit. Energy prices spiked. Concerns about global trade stability became front-page economic news. By mid-to-late March, the fighting had widened further still, touching Lebanon and Iraq, putting Gulf states directly in the crossfire, and raising genuine security anxieties as far away as the South Caucasus. On March 28, Yemen’s Houthi movement formally joined the conflict, launching missiles toward Israel and adding an entirely new front.

Early April brought both escalation and the first real diplomatic pressure for an end. The Houthis’ involvement added yet another threat to regional shipping lanes, compounding the Hormuz disruption. Heavy US-Israeli strikes and Iranian retaliation continued through the first week of the month, but mounting military and economic costs on all sides started pushing diplomacy to the front of the conversation.

A ceasefire arrived on April 8 – the first genuine pause in direct fighting since the war began. It reduced active combat and opened the door to negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, maritime access, and the status of the Strait of Hormuz. It also proved fragile almost immediately – a pattern that would repeat itself.

June brought a brief diplomatic breakthrough. The US and Iran announced an agreement and signed a memorandum of understanding intended to end the war outright and reopen the Strait of Hormuz to normal shipping traffic. It didn’t hold. On July 8, the MOU collapsed entirely after attacks on commercial vessels in the Gulf, and US strikes on Iran resumed – effectively resetting the clock on the conflict.

In August and September, the main front remained relatively calm with occasional tit-for-tat hits and strikes on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. The main stage shifted to the Red Sea, where the Yemeni Houthis launched an offensive, taking much of the Red Sea coast and directly confronting Saudi Arabia. The threat to alternative energy routes became palpable.

Attacks on commercial shipping around the Strait of Hormuz have continued through October. On October 28, Qatari mediators reportedly presented Iran with a new proposal aimed at ending the conflict outright. The very next day, a ship was reported on fire in the strait, alongside renewed and disputed signals about possible US-Iran contacts. The Wall Street Journal reported this week that the US had warned Gulf partners of a possible short, intense renewal of the war after the midterms conclude. With the midterms getting closer, President Trump has been sending mixed signals. All cards seem to be on the table.

What does this war get to do with the midterms? Since the very beginning it’s been tangled up with the cost of living, with public confidence in Trump personally, and with a deepening uncertainty about how, or whether, this thing actually ends.

The polling is not kind. A Pew Research Center survey conducted September 28 through October 4 found 65% of Americans disapproved of Trump’s handling of the military action, against just 33% who approved. Only 34% said the initial decision to use force had been the right call. Nearly half – 47% – expected the conflict to drag on for more than another year, a number that signals genuine war fatigue. Opposition runs strongest among Democrats, unsurprisingly, but support has softened among Republicans too – which matters enormously in close races.

The political risk here isn’t that Trump’s core supporters abandon him outright – that’s not really happening. Poll after poll shows the same figure of roughly 30% for Trump’s core base. The risk is more dangerous for the Republican Party itself: less committed Republicans simply lose enthusiasm, stop volunteering, stop showing up to vote, stop campaigning as hard. Trump understands this issue clearly. For months he’s been calling voters to participate as if he were on the ballot.

Household budgets are where this war has actually landed for most Americans, and that’s increasingly how it’s being measured politically. The Pentagon now estimates the war has cost at least $47.1 billion through October 16 alone – a figure that covers operational costs and equipment replacement but notably excludes some expenses, including damage to US bases.

Higher energy and transportation costs have pushed this war into everyday economic conversation. Pew found that 73% of Americans are very or extremely concerned specifically about higher fuel prices. Democrats have seized on that link between war and affordability as a direct line of attack against Republican candidates, and notably, some Republicans in genuinely competitive races have started echoing the same frustration, calling for a swift end to the conflict rather than defending it outright.

The broader polling picture suggests Democrats already have real momentum heading into the final stretch. An NPR/PBS News/Marist poll published October 27 put Democrats ahead 52% to 44% among likely voters on the generic congressional ballot. Cost of living topped voters’ concerns by a wide margin, cited by 34% as their leading issue, while foreign policy – including the war itself – was named as the top issue by just 5% of respondents. Even a decisive Democratic result on November 3 wouldn’t automatically end the war on its own – a new Congress could intensify oversight, challenge further military funding, and try to restrict presidential authority to continue the conflict, but this doesn’t guarantee an immediate policy change.

Chatham House‘s analysis argues American voters are broadly angry over both tariffs and war and that the midterms themselves won’t bring quick change regardless of outcome. Iran also has its stake in the US elections. Reuters reported that Iran may be deliberately prolonging the talks stalemate specifically to influence the US midterms, according to officials familiar with the negotiations.

How are the parties dealing with the Iran War issue?

Republicans

Five days before the election, Republicans are trying to thread the needle: stay loyal to a president whose signature foreign-policy decision is deeply unpopular without openly breaking with him in a way that risks alienating his base. The party isn’t speaking with one voice on this. Some leaders keep defending the campaign outright. Candidates in genuinely competitive races are increasingly calling for it to end.

Party leadership has largely backed Trump’s military approach and resisted congressional efforts to restrict his war-making authority. However, the longer this conflict drags on past what the administration itself originally projected, the harder it becomes for Republican candidates to promise voters anything resembling a quick, successful resolution.

A handful of Republicans facing genuinely difficult races have started publicly urging the administration to wrap the war up. Senate candidates Ashley Hinson in Iowa, Mike Rogers in Michigan, and Jon Husted in Ohio have all made versions of this argument, joined by other Republicans arguing the country needs to refocus on domestic priorities instead. Notice the careful framing running through nearly all of these statements: the message isn’t that confronting Iran was wrong from the start. It’s that the conflict has simply gone on too long and needs a clear exit strategy. That’s a deliberate, tactical distinction that lets candidates signal genuine concern about the war’s costs without openly breaking with Trump on national security or risking the anger of his most committed supporters.

The sharpest vulnerability is squarely economic, and it cuts against one of the Republican Party’s most durable brand advantages: the claim to be the party that manages the economy better. The war has pushed up gasoline and diesel prices directly, raising costs for commuters, farmers, truckers, and small businesses alike. Trump has argued publicly that higher fuel prices represent a temporary, worthwhile sacrifice in service of national security. On the ground it sounds badly out of touch.

Republican opposition remains limited in absolute numbers, but it’s become considerably more visible than it was even a few months ago. In September, seven House Republicans crossed the aisle to join Democrats in supporting a measure intended to halt or significantly constrain the war – the largest Republican defection on any such measure up to that point in the conflict. These disagreements reflect a genuine, longer-running tension inside the Republican coalition between traditional national-security hawks, Trump loyalists who back the administration’s approach on principle, and “America First” conservatives who’ve long opposed prolonged foreign entanglement on ideological grounds.

The broader Republican counter-strategy to the Iran War becoming a key issue during midterms leans heavily on domestic policy achievements and an argument that Democrats simply cannot be trusted with either the economy or national security. But Democrats have a genuine opening here, and they know it: connecting the war directly to voters’ monthly bills and arguing the administration broke an implicit promise to avoid another forever war.

Democrats

Democrats are running a three-part strategy on Iran: first, challenge Trump’s authority to wage this war without explicit congressional authorization; second, keep hammering the financial and human costs; third, argue that Republicans in Congress have simply failed to hold the administration accountable at any point over eight months of fighting.

On the first front, Democrats have repeatedly introduced congressional resolutions aimed at halting or limiting the military campaign absent clear congressional authorization. None of these resolutions have succeeded in actually stopping anything. But they’ve given Democrats something arguably more valuable heading into November: a clean, repeatable contrast against Republicans who’ve either actively backed Trump or simply declined to challenge him when given the chance.

On the cost front, Democrats are drawing a direct line between the war and higher fuel prices, economic uncertainty, and federal spending more broadly. The Pentagon’s own $47.1 billion estimate has handed Democrats a specific, citable number to anchor their argument that the administration is pouring enormous resources into a conflict with no clear end in sight. Democrats are also pressing hard for answers about civilian casualties and the administration’s actual military objectives.

Democrats have also made a notable recruiting choice: putting military veterans up as candidates specifically in districts with large military communities, on the theory that veteran credibility carries unique weight when it comes to questioning the administration’s wartime strategy. Jessica Killin in Colorado and Elaine Luria in Virginia both fit this mold directly, each arguing their military background gives them standing to challenge the administration’s handling of the war in a way a purely civilian candidate couldn’t credibly manage. Republicans have countered that this kind of criticism undermines US troops currently in the field.

Democrats, it’s worth being honest about, are not completely unified on the war issue either. Some favor an outright, immediate end to US military action – these are primarily the upcoming DSA candidates. Others, mostly the leadership, are notably more cautious about opposing the campaign outright, whether out of genuine policy disagreement or concern about how criticism of the war might be read in relation to Israel and broader US security commitments in the region.

Looking past November 3 itself, Democrats argue a victory would let them intensify oversight substantially – hearings, subpoenas, formal demands for information about casualties, military spending, and damage to US bases that the Pentagon’s own cost figures have so far left out. They could also use control over spending bills specifically to condition or restrict funding for continued operations, a lever that carries real weight regardless of how the broader political fight over the war’s legitimacy plays out. A Democratic Senate majority specifically would add leverage over defense and national-security appointments too, compounding the pressure points available to a new Congress.

What do experts say about where this actually goes? We asked four political scientists to weigh in directly.

Thad Kousser, Department of Political Science Professor, Division of Graduate Education and Postdoctoral Affairs Associate Dean, Center for Transparent and Trusted Elections Co-Director, Yankelovich Center for Social Science Research Co-Director at UC San Diego, offered a historically grounded assessment.

“Dissatisfaction about the war in Iran among many in President Trump’s electoral base – especially younger voters, some of them veterans – dragged down his approval ratings when the conflict defied a quick resolution. Since then, his unpopularity has broadened as a result of increases in fuel costs and then prices across the board. Dissatisfaction with the war and inflation is part of what has cost him support among younger voters and Hispanics, at least according to polls. His party’s concern is that these groups will vote more strongly for Democrats than they did in the 2024 presidential contest and that President Trump’s electoral base – which is generally older, wealthier, and less diverse – will be less likely to turn out.

Wars can have a huge impact on midterm elections, depending on how voters view their success. When Americans rallied around the flag after the September 11 attacks and the early victory in Afghanistan, President Bush’s party won seats in the 2002 midterms – a rare feat for a president. Yet as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan dragged on, his party suffered a major defeat in the 2006 midterms.”

Daniel Wirls, Politics Department Professor at the University of California, Santa Cruz, answered two specific questions about the war’s electoral mechanics.

Wyoming Star: If the administration were to intensify military operations, negotiate a ceasefire, or announce a withdrawal before Election Day, how might each development affect the midterms?

“My sense is that any change in the Iran conflict before the election is a detriment to Republicans. Withdrawal is not politically viable (akin to defeat), and escalation would be almost worse, putting it right in front of voters with days to go before the election. Even some sort of agreement – it is rather improbable at this stage that Iran would agree to anything before the elections – would look at best like a ‘tie.’ All that for what? Reopening the Strait that was open before the war?”

Wyoming Star: What practical difference could a change in congressional control make to US policy toward Iran?

“Obviously a lot could happen after the elections but before the new Congress is installed, regardless of the results. But if the conflict continued into 2027, then depending on the use of the ‘filibuster’ in the Senate, a Democratic Congress could 1) pass a robust War Powers Resolution ordering an end to US military action, but Trump could and would veto it, or 2) pass a spending restriction such that no funds can be used to continue military operations against Iran. This too would be subject to Trump’s veto. Finally, a Democratic Congress could play hardball by cutting funding or adding restrictions to the FY 2027 budget request made by Trump. But that would be early in the budget cycle, probably too early to use the risk of a budget crisis or shutdown as leverage. In short, a Democratic Congress, short of a veto-proof margin, has limited tools. And as unpopular as the war might be, they would have to be mindful of public opinion in relation to the tactics they might employ.”

Prof. Wirls is working on a new book titled “Nuclear Nation: America and the Forever Arsenal of the Apocalypse.“

Benjamin Noble, Assistant Professor of Political Science at UC San Diego, offered a sharper distinction between the war’s salience as an issue and its actual electoral impact.

“A majority of Americans disapprove of the Iran War, and it is likely to impact the midterms, but not because voters are viewing it as an important issue in its own right. In recent pre-election polls from Gallup and Pew, foreign policy and wars sit well below economic concerns, dissatisfaction with political leaders, and healthcare. However, consumer confidence is lower than it has been in over a decade. Many Americans name the cost of living and inflation as their most important problems. But of course, those high prices, especially where gas is concerned, have been driven by the war. So, it will definitely matter. Just not because the war itself is top of mind.

In general, we should not be too surprised by these trends. Americans are often more concerned about domestic political issues. There have occasionally been breaks from this pattern in recent history, especially in the post-9/11 period. But since the Obama presidency, few Americans have named foreign affairs as their most important issue. Those surveys tend to be dominated by the economy, immigration, healthcare, crime, and political polarization. Most voters are focused on matters closer to home.

If Democrats win either chamber of Congress, that is likely to affect the Trump administration’s ability to carry out the war. The president will need funding from Congress, which means negotiating with Democrats. Although the administration has found creative ways to move money around, a Democratic majority would have some leverage over spending. They may use that power to rein in the war or, at the very least force administration officials to testify in Congress.”

Prof. Noble’s public-facing writing on American politics can be found here.

Nathaniel Swigger, Associate Professor with the College of Arts and Sciences‘ Department of Political Science at the Ohio State University, offered the shortest and perhaps bleakest assessment of the group.

“The story of public opinion on war is pretty clear: it always goes down. For every conflict that we have, data support for the war declines over time. The only exception is a decisive final victory, which will lead to a surge at the very end. I wouldn’t expect things to look different in Iran. The longer it goes on, the worse it will be for the administration.”

So where are we five days before election day? The picture is genuinely uncomfortable for Republicans. The war itself ranks far down most voters’ list of top concerns, but it directly links with the issue voters actually do care about most: the cost of everything, gas above all. Democrats have built a strategy explicitly designed to exploit the war’s outsized economic effects, while Republicans are stuck defending a conflict that’s blown past every timeline the administration originally offered, with no clean resolution available.

Eight months in, with billions spent and a ceasefire record of exactly zero successes, the war that was supposed to be over in two weeks is now shaping an election it was never supposed to touch at all. How much winning can a man take…?